First, physics is necessarily based on metaphysical assumptions, for example about the uniformity and universality of the laws of nature. One can try to ignore these assumptions, but they are there, and they guide research. So the physicists who ignore them are doing their job blindfolded, stumbling around.
Second, and most importantly, physics requires an interpretation. Without an interpretation, physics is not properly understood. And to interpret physics, to figure out what physics is telling us about reality, just is to engage in metaphysical thinking, to step into the kingdom of analytic metaphysics.
Here is the metaphysician of science Matteo Morganti's view on the relationship between metaphysics and science:
"metaphysics grounds the interpretation of scientific theories, and thus science is ... dependent on philosophy." (Combining Science and Metaphysics, 2013; my emphasis)
But why do we need an interpretation? Isn't it enough to just know how to make predictions and so on? Well, if one is solely interested in having practical, mundane expertise, then one does not have to interpret science. But this kind of instrumentalist attitude, the attitude of an engineer or a technician, is in direct opposition to what the goal of science is, what actually motivates scientists to do science, which is to seek understanding and knowledge.
Meinard Kuhlmann, who has developed a dispositional trope ontology for quantum field theory, puts it well:
"[Instrumentalists] deny that scientific theories are meant to represent the world in the first place. For them, theories are only instruments for making experimental predictions. Still, most scientists have the strong intuition that their theories do depict at least some aspects of nature as it is before we make a measurement. After all, why else do science, if not to understand the world? Acquiring a comprehensive picture of the physical world requires the combination of physics with philosophy." (What is real? 2013; my emphasis)
Morganti again:
"[N]on-interpreted science is not as much 'understood' as 'usable'. ... At best, in such a case one has merely practical knowledge. ... [T]he deeper meaning of such theories can only come to the surface through sophisticated philosophical analysis." (Combining Science and Metaphysics, 2013; my emphasis)
At this point the critic of metaphysics could argue that metaphysics is not really understood either. In fact, she could say, metaphysical theories are even less clear than the mathematically formulated theories of physics. Here is Bas van Fraassen, an opponent of metaphysics:
"metaphysicians interpret what we initially understand into something hardly anyone understands." (The Empirical Stance, 2002)
But this is simply not the case. First, physics is not "initially understood" without metaphysics, it is just empty formalism. Second, analytic metaphysics is probably the most clear and rigorous subfield in the whole of contemporary philosophy. Theories and definitions are formulated in painstaking rigor, connections to ordinary language are provided, and step-by-step arguments are given, often with the help of formal logic. For example, here is the analytic metaphysician Hud Hudson's analysis of touching, the metaphysical relation of being in perfect contact:
"Necessarily, x touches y if and only if ∃R2, ∃w, ∃v, ∃p (i) w is a part of x, whereas v is a part of y, (ii) w exactly occupies R1, whereas v exactly occupies R2, (iii) p is a boundary point of both R1 and R2, (iv) p is a member of at least one of R1 and R2, and (v) w ≠ v." (Touching, 2001)
A definition couldn't be any clearer. More examples could be given. Thus, contemporary analytic metaphysics is better understood than the bare formalism of non-interpreted physics, and it provides the necessary tools for interpreting that formalism.
To conclude: if one seeks understanding and knowledge, then doing philosophy, especially metaphysics, is absolutely necessary.
Ei kommentteja:
Lähetä kommentti