"Spacetime is substance enough. There is no need for the dualism of the contained and the contained (or for fundamental containment relations). When God makes the world, she needs only create spacetime. Then she can pin the fundamental properties directly to spacetime." (Jonathan Schaffer, Spacetime the one substance, 2009)
Supersubstantivalists identify physical objects with regions of spacetime. Ockham's razor favors the view over substantivalism, which unnecessarily includes both spacetime and physical objects as two distinct fundamental substances. The third option, relationalism, which derives spacetime from relations between physical objects and thus includes only physical objects in its fundamental ontology, cannot accommodate the notion of unoccupied locations without making major concessions to substantivalists (supersubstantivalists can just talk about some regions lacking certain properties). Supersubstantivalism is the clear winner.
Therefore, I am not in space and time. I am a piece of space and time, that is, a bundle of spacetime points. Here I am in partial agreement with Theodore Sider:
Therefore, I am not in space and time. I am a piece of space and time, that is, a bundle of spacetime points. Here I am in partial agreement with Theodore Sider:
"Although my ontology contains no physical objects per se, it does contain entities with which they may naturally be identified: the sets of spacetime points that they occupy. I, for example, can be identified with a set whose earliest points are around 1967, whose temporal cross-sections are person-shaped, and which continues on into the future for an unknown duration." (Writing the Book of the World, 2012)My agreement is only partial because Sider is a mereological nihilist and I am not. I am not just a set of spacetime points, I am their fusion.
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